How America Could Fall

Our final debate focused much on internal issues. Maybe this is due to the way the presidential primaries are turning out now. With Trump advocating policies that are war crimes and military leader publicly stating such orders would be ignored, with Cruz advocating carpet bombing ISIS (news flash, carpet bombing is not a good tactic against insurgents. More importantly, it's a tactic not a strategy), and with Clinton claiming foreign policy mastery after she voted for the Iraq invasion and advocated for the Libyan intervention, which didn't turn out all that good for anyone, no wonder we are concerned with internal issues.

However, I don't feel that such issues raised, such as education, infrastructure investment, healthcare, etc. will have the impact people seemed to think it will. These are all connected with economic development, true, however the US has been surprisingly able to adapt to economic shocks before. Lets not forget that unemployment is around 5.5%, which is not great but also not such a concerning average. Our educational institutions still attract the highly capable students from overseas. Our internal issues can be overcome.

A quick glance at the classic hard power issues like military capabilities and economic strength shows there are no short term realistic challengers. Russia, while it has been flexing its strength recently, is much more of a regional bully than an international threat. And with oil prices as low as they are Russia is limited in it's economic ability to continue expeditionary deployments. China, while more of a rising concern, is so economically tied to the US that a military conflict in the short term is almost unthinkable. Their economy is slowing down, they have a lot of overcapacity, and it is still an open question as to if China can maintain enough economic growth to keep the population satisfied. 

Climate change was offered as a threat, but I don't believe it ranks that highly. Rising sea levels coupled with dramatic shifts in rain patterns will have huge effects for sure. However, given the technological sophistication of our agriculture as well as the wealth in the economy, I believe we would be able to adapt. Not to mention Russia and China will be experiencing the same issues.

More importantly, we never defined what the basis of American power in the world is. I would argue that it's not just our ability to expeditionarily employ an advanced conventional military, nor is it just our advanced economy, even with all of its internal flaws. I would argue that historically it has been the soft power we can wield that is the true source of strength. How to make friends and influence people should be a guiding philosophy for our international relations. There are no existential threats to our security, but not playing by the rules we demand of others in fear of overblown threats will further damage our reputation and therefore our power. That is our most likely path to downfall.

The Hegemon

The readings for this module have raised some great points, and I dare say one could structure an entire course around this module. In particular I want to explore the Ikenberry piece about the nature of American power.

I truly appreciate the three ways in which America interacts with the world. Empire, hegemony and security community are good baselines to work from in looking at the current state of affairs. The idea of a security community is a good lens to view America's relationships with Europe. With the expansion of the EU and NATO to include many former Soviet states the community accounts for almost half of the global GDP and one seventh of global population. Of course there are disagreements within this bloc, and much has been made recently about if the EU can survive the recent issues it has had. Regardless, this is a robust political, economic, and military bloc that will almost certainly settle differences without force or outright coercion in the foreseeable future. This recent resurgence of Russia makes the community seem more robust.

Not much has been made in the articles about America acting as an imperial power in relations with South America, Africa and the Middle East. This is a topic that I am in general unfamiliar with, with the exception of America's efforts in the Middle East. An issue that wasn't addressed was China's rising influence in these parts of the globe. A contrast between American and Chinese interactions would be quite interesting.

Now for the pivot to the Pacific. Beeson's piece makes an interesting point about China's rise, at least as of 2009. The use of soft power and diplomacy to provide a counter point to American assertiveness in the region may have been the strategy in the past, but it appears this may not continue. The island building projects in the South China Sea are creating a lot of anxiety in the region, even leading to a statement by ASEAN saying member states are 'seriously concerned' about recent developments. Is this a sign that China is starting to act more as a Great Power that can do what it has the power to do, as Athens saw itself? Will this lead to more cooperation in the Pacific? The rise of security community aimed at protecting itself from China?

Public Authority and Identity

One of the more interesting articles from my perspective was the McNamara piece  “Constructing Authority in the European Union". The idea of constructing an identity is crucial to understanding bigger issues of sovereignty and authority in the current world environment.

One of the related issues we have discussed is the idea of how technology is challenging the traditional sovereignty of the nation state. This is not a new phenomenon. Martin Luther's 95 Theses were a challenge to the Catholic Church's authority in the pre-Westphalian system. A more modern example can be found with the spreading of communist ideology in Imperial Russia prior to the 1917 Revolution. In these cases ideology that challenged state authority were spread through written materials made possible by printing. In our current era one only needs a cell phone to be able to create, spread, or read a wide range of ideologies with few if any limits put on veracity.

The spread of ISIS is a great example of how creating an identity can be used to take sovereignty and public authority. By having a flag and an ideology they are able to maintain the identity of a nation state. Granted, this was only possible in the power vacuum of revolutionary Syria, but it provides a non-state example of identity formation and sovereignty in action. This is similar in form to the theory that McNamara postulated about a European Identity, although for very different aims.

This is important because in the future there may be competing notions of identity that may have an impact on state sovereignty. Will established nation states be able to maintain a national identity in the face of competing ideologies in the future?

Foreign Aid

The topic of foreign aid is one that could easily consume an entire career, much less a portion of an online class. Although my focus area is not International Development, it is an important topic to consider regardless. 

Aid is obviously a controversial topic, and not just in how it is implemented. The basic assumption behind foreign aid, that states and NGOs have the right to dictate to other states how to handle their internal affairs, can be problematic. Instead of looking at these valid critiques of foreign aid, I'd like to examine the idea of utilizing foreign aid for desired strategic affects.

The first example that comes to mind is the Marshall Plan, or the European Recovery Plan. This massive economic assistance plan was designed to enable development in Europe post World War II, which was seen as critical to establish Western Europe as a capable partner in the Cold War. The plan itself committed 10% of the national budget at the time to foreign aid. It was a huge investment, and I suggest it was well spent, given the trade and military relationships between the US and Western Europe.

Another, more modern example of foreign aid for strategic goals can be seen in our relations with both Israel and Egypt. The two nations take the lions share of our 'foreign aid' in the form of military assistance. In 1979, our aid to Egypt was critical in the peace process between the two nations, which have not fought each other since, and in fact work together to an extent in the security realm today. Although this aid is military in nature, it helps to achieve strategic goals.

So what are some potential areas for utilizing aid in a more strategic manner? I think a prime example is infectious disease control. It's easy to ignore problems when they do not seem to have a direct affect on your own soil, but swine flu, bird flu, ebola and now zika have all shown that diseases know no borders. A comprehensive assistance plan that involves all parts of the government, from aid for medical center construction, education for medical professionals, and utilizing the military for assistance during pandemics could achieve much for both the populations directly at risk as well as ensuring the health of all nations. If run correctly, this can also generate soft power for the US.

Strategic Trade Agreement

At one point in the lecture, Professor Jackson brings up strategic trade agreements, and poses the question about if these are coercion through another means. It seems as though coercion may be an incorrect way of looking at the circumstances.

Leverage may be a better way of analyzing trade agreements, strategic or not. In any bilateral trade agreement, one nation or another may have more or less leverage in a particular area. A poor nation may have access to specific raw materials. China and India are such large countries that access to their markets gives them leverage.

So what would make a trade agreement strategic? Just because the US and the UK trade doesn't mean any agreements made are not mutually advantageous. Even one of the most strategic economic plans in US history, the Marshall Plan, was advantageous to American businesses because European countries became markets for American goods. I doubt that coercion had a large role to play in that example.

In more modern situations, utilizing a trade agreement to further other geo-political goals of a nation is not necessarily coercion. One state may be able to negotiate better terms in a trade deal due to some effects that another nation may want to have. But to call that coercion is going a bit too far.

Nuke and Change

One of the theories we have had in class is that one of the ways change in the international occurs is through shocks to the system. In my group's presentation we brought up the reasons why nations that currently possess nuclear weapons will not disarm, and I think that's a pretty convincing argument. However, the idea of a traumatic event might be a key to changing the system.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the world has come to a nuclear exchange, and there have been numerous mishaps throughout the world involving nuclear weapons. Since none of these events have resulted in appreciable change in the theory of mutually assured destruction, I doubt anything short of a limited nuclear exchange would result in a dramatic disarmament plan.

There are two possible scenarios that I see could realistically bring about a limited nuclear exchange. The first is an India/Pakistan scenario, and the second is a war between NATO and Russia, but only one where Russia utilizes its escalate to de-escalate strategy. There are many other possible scenarios that involve nuclear weapons, but they don't meet the criteria. First, a large scale nuclear exchange between any combination of NATO, Russia, and China will be so devastating as to its effects that humanity may not survive. Second, a war between a small nuclear armed state, such as North Korea, and NATO, as long as a more capable ally does not become a belligerent, would not necessarily involve nukes, due to the overwhelming conventional capabilities of the US.

The two viable scenarios involve the use of enough nuclear weapons to have dramatic consequences for the world's environment and economies, but not enough to end the system all together. The result of either scenario could conceive of a change to the system akin to the founding of the UN. The real sticking point in this scenario is the requirement that nations give up portions of their sovereignty, the ability to use nuclear weapons, in exchange for the security that such dramatic events will not happen again.

And the desire for nations to hold on to their sovereignty and autonomy in terms of national security in all circumstances is precisely why change in the form of nuclear regulation is so difficult.

PSCs and Sovereignty

One of the final questions that Prof. Jackson posed during the module was if there is such a thing as 'legitimate violence'. I think this question lays a great foundation for the discussion of PSCs and Organized Crime. This also serves to highlight that purely internal matters for a state have an impact on broader issues of sovereignty and legitimacy.

The simple answer to his question of legitimate violence is that it depends. In a liberal democracy, the government theoretically exercises power because it has the consent of the governed. Laws are enacted and enforced because the will of the majority is being expressed. Limits to that authority exist because of the respect for civil and human rights of all citizens. Or so theory states. In practice it's a much muddier picture.

However, there are many dictatorial regimes that do not even pretend to have limits to power. Where is the legitimacy of state security forces in that context? In such a situation, any PSC that derives authority from the state is lacking legitimacy by extension. In this frame, the PSC does not diminish the sovereignty of the state in any appreciable way because the state does not have legitimacy in the first place. The PSC is just another tool for government will.

This is in contrast to a situation where a PSC is able to gain enough control within a state so that it can change the rule of law to benefit the PSC. However, this is just as possible with any other corporate entity. The only difference is that a PSC's business is security, not just commodity extraction or manufacturing. So the threat to sovereignty comes from any corporation.

Can the World be Remade?

This week's debate brought up many interesting arguments surrounding the question about if the international environment can be fundamentally remade. Although we expanded our scope towards the end, there is a topic that we didn't really delve into much, and that is the role of corporations.

Corporations have always had a role in the international environment, but people could argue that they are taking on a different role than they have in the past. Multi-national corporations extend beyond the borders of any individual state. Many take on the roles that states have traditionally held a monopoly on, such as espionage and security. Private security firms, such as the former Blackwater, possess military capabilities comparable to some states.

Combined with an ability to evade laws by setting up operations in a state with a more permissive legal environment there is the potential for changes to the international system. We have debated if states act out of interest or ideas, but I don't think this question applies to corporations writ large. A state must govern. A corporation does not have to.

However, these issues are not new. The Dutch East India Company had many of the hallmarks of a modern corporation. It also took on many of the powers usually reserved for states. It waged war, operated a legal system, and had a currency. The company began as a state-sanctioned monopoly. It did not operate as independently of the Dutch government as many modern corporations do.

In the foreseeable future corporations will not challenge the primacy of states in the international realm. They will, however, take on an increasingly important role on the international stage. The role they take will be determined by how willing governments will be to enforcing their laws and norms on corporations.

It's easy to get lost in the theory of these readings without seeing how they practically apply to current issues in international relations. However, Wendt's , “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," does exactly that. In looking to the future of relations between the post-communist Russia and the west, he says:

"Notwithstanding today's rhetoric about the end of the cold war, skeptics may still doubt whether Gorbachev (or some future leader) will succeed in building an intersubjective basis for a new Soviet (or Russian) role identity. There are important domestic, bureaucratic, and cognitive-ideological sources of resistance in both East and West to such a change, not the least of which is the shakiness of the democratic forces' domestic position. But if my argument about the role of intersubjective knowledge in creating competitive structures of identity and interest is right, then at least New Thinking shows a greater appreciation-conscious or not-for the deep structure of power politics than we are accustomed to in international relations practice." (Page 422[PDF 33])

It seems that the last few years have brought a return to some of the power politics between East and West. Russian rhetoric often talks about NATO as a threat to Russian national security. How is it that an organization which is defined as a mutual defense organization is viewed as an offensive threat to Russia? (NATO treaty text if you are interested. In short, Article 5 states an attack against one in Europe or North America is an attack against all.)

I think a good explanation lies in Wendt's article. He lays out an argument that, as I interpret it, suggests Russia has returned to its identity as enemy of the West. It seems that the 'important domestic, bureaucratic, and cognitive-ideological sources of resistance'  have won out, and that, for the time being, antagonistic relations between East and West will remain. Is it a coincidence that Putin is a former KGB officer?

There is much room for critical analysis of the West's actions since 1990. Particularly the interventions in the Balkans in 1995 and 1999 are often cited as evidence of Western aggression and reasons for Russia to be fearful. However, I believe that these actions are interpreted as aggressive towards Russia only if one believes that Russia and the West are antagonists already.

Ideas

Recently, a lot of class has been taken up by trying to determine exactly how ideas are expressed in conflicts between states. We've had some good discussions on the subject, and I'm starting to come away from the conversations with different thoughts on ideas than I had before.

The concept of treating ideas like symbolic technologies is an interesting route to go on. To paraphrase an argument from the readings, page 217 of Laffey and Weldes, this is indeed like finding oneself buying into the mind set of a group after using the terminology of the group. The very act of using the terminology, language, and conceptions of a symbolic technology change one's own world view. That is the power of ideas. Almost like if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

It seems to me that the end result of this concept is that symbolic technologies define the world that an actor is living in. In the United States we see NATO as a guarantor of security for individual states. Russia sees NATO as a threat to its very existence. Is it any wonder that Russia would go so far as to annex Crimea to secure access to the Black Sea if there was even a hint of Ukraine becoming more friendly with NATO?

An article on RT, essentially an English language mouthpiece of the Kremlin, quotes a spokesman:

"The Kremlin has warned that NATO’s further advance towards Russia’s borders will entail counter measures.

“We must not forget that NATO is an organization that has been created during the time of confrontation and for confrontation, that’s why it cannot change its nature,” the Russian president’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, told reporters in Moscow, as cited by Sputnik.

“That is why any advancement by such an organization toward our borders will force us to take adequate counter-measures to safeguard own security, our national security,” Peskov said." https://www.rt.com/news/316237-poroshenko-ukraine-nato-outpost/

The mere existence of NATO is a threat to Russia. The annexation was not an act of aggression, it was essential to Russia's national security interests. This isn't a question of ideas vs interests, this is an example of the world view, the frame of mind, the symbolic technology defining the basic concept of the interest.

Interests

So, while attempting to avoid rereading Max Weber to find out what I missed (I've had to read too many Germans recently. My head is full of Clausewitz for another class outside of this curriculum.), I started to ponder the ideas and interests question. In an attempt to make some real world connections, I started to think about how policy, the actual manifestations of our theoretical discussions, is created.

Naturally, the way policy is created differs between states. There are also differences over time. For this post I want to look at modern democracies. I would suggest that the policy development cycle in North Korea could be summed up by what kind of day Kim Jong-un is having. The thoughts of your average North Korean peasant (since they are surely not treated as citizens) probably don't have much effect on policy.

However, a modern democracy is supposed to be derived from the people. How accurately this happens is an open question. However, I think I can point to some situations where policy was clearly influenced by ideas within the population and not some hard calculation of interests.

The one I will look at now is the divestment movement regarding South Africa during Apartheid. Prior to the divestment movement, the US had ties with South Africa in the context of the Cold War. I argue that this was classic interest based policy. However, during the 1980s the divestment movement gained popularity throughout the US, and culminated with the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Interestingly enough, the act was vetoed by Reagan but overriden by Congress.

Although claims can be made that by imposing sanctions against South Africa the US was in fact furthering its interests because it was maintaining the narrative that the US supports freedom and democracy world wide, as opposed to the Soviet Union. However, I believe that the Reagan veto represents the 'interest' side and the override represented the 'ideas' side.

Rational Actors

The readings for this week brought up a great point that I think deserves a lot of attention. This point is that we often consider the entities we study to be rational actors. This is often an assumption that is used in economics, and I assume in many other social sciences as well.

In economics we assume that consumers and producers will act rationally to maximize their utility. Firms will do whatever they can to maximize their profits. Individuals will do the same. And they behave in a way that is rational and knowable. But what happens when that isn't the case? Look at the stock market, and tell me that the valuation of stocks are always based purely on rational reasoning and not on irrational considerations.

Similarly, the idea of perfect information is a common assumption. In economics, we assume that actors have perfect information and are able to act on it. However, this is rarely the case. An everyday example is how one shops for groceries. If you knew all the time exactly how much each good cost at every store, you would be able to maximize your utility by buying your desired goods at the lowest cost. But you don't know exactly how much things cost before you go to the store, so you can't make the 'rational' choice.

So, many actors in the international realm, from states down to individuals, are often irrational actors that do not have perfect information. This seems axiomatic, however keeping this in mind when looking at why actors take the measures they do is important.

Coercion and Rational Discourse

For the past week I've found myself going back and forth on this question. Are all interactions between two entities in the international area based on coercion or rational discourse? I think the answer is yes.

It's easy to find elements of both lines of thought. For now I'm going to disregard all interactions that are not state vs. state for the sake of simplicity. Specifically, I want to look at the realm of international trade and how nations regulate that trade.

Our group looked at the WTO, and I think it's a perfect example of how elements of both coercion and rational discourse are apparent in the system. First, the WTO started a bit like Hobbes' description of the Commonwealth. Member nations, through negotiation, voluntarily created a system that gave up some rights in exchange for a way to normalize trade between member states. The rights that were given up were not so extreme as what Hobbes described, but they are important. These rights include measures such as placing import bans and tariffs on products from other nations that do not conform to some standard in the importing country(environmental, health and safety, labor laws, etc.). 

By giving up these rights, the member nations agreed to abide by rulings issued by a dispute resolution system. If a member state is found to not be in compliance with the agreed upon standards, they have three options. First, they can remove the disputed measure. Second, if they do not, they can provide compensation for measure. Third, if they do neither the state that brought the charges may retaliate in kind.

As you can see, there are some basic elements of coercion in the system. If all else fails, and two nations can not agree to a way to resolve the dispute, then attempt at raw coercive power is made. However, retaliation is rare.

So, in terms of trade relations between states, the answer is yes. Although rational discourse is the basis for agreements, some element of coercion will remain in place. 

World Trade Organization