It's easy to get lost in the theory of these readings without seeing how they practically apply to current issues in international relations. However, Wendt's , “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," does exactly that. In looking to the future of relations between the post-communist Russia and the west, he says:

"Notwithstanding today's rhetoric about the end of the cold war, skeptics may still doubt whether Gorbachev (or some future leader) will succeed in building an intersubjective basis for a new Soviet (or Russian) role identity. There are important domestic, bureaucratic, and cognitive-ideological sources of resistance in both East and West to such a change, not the least of which is the shakiness of the democratic forces' domestic position. But if my argument about the role of intersubjective knowledge in creating competitive structures of identity and interest is right, then at least New Thinking shows a greater appreciation-conscious or not-for the deep structure of power politics than we are accustomed to in international relations practice." (Page 422[PDF 33])

It seems that the last few years have brought a return to some of the power politics between East and West. Russian rhetoric often talks about NATO as a threat to Russian national security. How is it that an organization which is defined as a mutual defense organization is viewed as an offensive threat to Russia? (NATO treaty text if you are interested. In short, Article 5 states an attack against one in Europe or North America is an attack against all.)

I think a good explanation lies in Wendt's article. He lays out an argument that, as I interpret it, suggests Russia has returned to its identity as enemy of the West. It seems that the 'important domestic, bureaucratic, and cognitive-ideological sources of resistance'  have won out, and that, for the time being, antagonistic relations between East and West will remain. Is it a coincidence that Putin is a former KGB officer?

There is much room for critical analysis of the West's actions since 1990. Particularly the interventions in the Balkans in 1995 and 1999 are often cited as evidence of Western aggression and reasons for Russia to be fearful. However, I believe that these actions are interpreted as aggressive towards Russia only if one believes that Russia and the West are antagonists already.