PSC's, Sovereignty, and Machiavelli's Warnings

Upon reading the work by Abrahamsen and Williams Security beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics, Machiavelli’s warnings about mercenaries and auxiliary forces quickly came to mind. In chapter 12 of The Prince Machiavelli states:

The mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous, and if anyone has a state founded on the arms of mercenaries, he will never be stable or secure, because they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, disloyal; bold among friends, among enemies cowardly, without fear of God, without faith in men; and your ruin is deferred only as long as the assault is deferred; and in peace you are plundered by them, in war by the enemy.

He then explains the reason as:

The reason for this is that they have no love or any motive that keeps them in the field other than a little bit of salary, which is not enough to make them willing to die for you. They are quite willing to be your soldiers as long as you are not waging war, but when war comes, then it is: retreat or run away.

This concern was somewhat reiterated in class by the students. With PSC’s there is a question of accountability and who they are really serving. Another student pointed out that many of the individuals employed by these firms are ex U.S. military and may be serving U.S. interests to an extent. I must give credit to Genorie and Meshal for bring up these excellent points. From the onset of reading this text I certainly shared this skepticism and the article has only just begun to alleviate that skepticism.

Following this kind of reasonable skepticism and Machiavelli’s warnings one can consider PSC’s to be a threat to the sovereignty of the states that require their services. However, after reading the article, it seems that understanding the PSC’s as international firms helps to put the PSC’s under a slightly different light. As large firms susceptible to market conditions and public scrutiny they are less likely to neatly fit into the mold set by Machiavelli regarding Mercenaries. This makes it less likely for individual ambitions amongst the security personnel to negatively affect those that employ them assuming that they are working under contracts the security personnel view as fair. Assuming that the firms are strong and stable enough to be considered a foreign force rather than a force of individual mercenaries we might then consider Machiavelli’s thoughts on Auxiliary forces in chapter 13 of The Prince.

These troops can be useful and good in themselves, but they are almost always harmful for the man who calls them in, for if they lose, you are undone; if they win, you remain their prisoner.

The auxiliary forces provided by firms however stand apart from those described by Machiavelli in sever ways. One key difference is that the security PSC’s given in the examples were typically working to safe guard the assets of private entities. In both cases these assets were natural resources. These assets or natural resources are typically also large sources of economic growth or at least sustainability for the countries that are home to these assets. Because of this, the interests of the local governments and firms providing the PSC’s were in line. Furthermore, with a sole focus on profit, the firms that hire the PSC’s are less likely to challenge the authority of the local governments as it would likely be too costly for any firm to govern an entire population. With that it seems less likely that they would hold a state “prisoner” although it was noted that the dynamics between the PSC’s and the local governments were sometime criticized along the lines that the firms might be able to influence the vulnerable local governments. This might very well be the case but it probably wouldn’t be through the tradition coercive force that Machiavelli refers to and this kind of private influence on government from firms can arguably be seen across the globe.  

Regarding PSC’s and coercive force. There has been a lot of pushback to the attempts of the PSC’s to use arms in the host countries. This has increased the need for the PSC’s to work together with local forces. Additionally, the article by Abrahamsen and Williams specifically notes the following about the PSC’s in the Niger Delta:

In the past, the oil companies at the very least tolerated, and in some eyes promoted, the highly coercive security strategies of the Nigerian police and military (Okonta and Douglas 2003; Meier 2004). There are now signs that companies are seeking (at least in part) to abandon such strategies and to distance themselves from the coercion of public security services, in recognition of the failure of these policies and the considerable international opposition and negative publicity they have generated. Instead, the oil companies are adopting more ‘comprehensive’’ security strategies incorporating community engagement and development (Omeje 2006; SPDC 2002).   

  

                Although the article also notes that the degree of commitment to this strategy is questionable it does show a significant step away from the tradition use of coercive force. It seems more than likely, commitment to this strategy will increase in response to continuous positive feedback. If it works they will continue to employ it. This also illustrates that both the international firms, PSC’s, and local governments are working together along similar interests to increase their total capacity to enforce their various forms of authority, whether it is an authority to govern or an authority over an asset to be collected and put into market. Skepticism still seems reasonable about these security assemblages however and only time will tell if such alliance truly are tenuous. That being said this article certainly opens up the door to an idealized world where such long lasting assemblages and perhaps even some sort of globalized security might be conceivable.

Organized Crime

I find the subject of organized crime fascinating.  The unwritten rules of conduct, the understanding of different norms and how to enforce their rules.  I'll admit an interest in Al Capone and the gangsters of old.  The thing that I never really thought of until now was states perceptions of the impermeability of their borders, yet organized crime's ability to slip through them like water through a sieve. 

We often have been referring to North Korea as the state that is most impermeable to things like the internet and Western influence, but I ask you - if their borders were impermeable, then no one would ever be able to leave, right?  And yet, there are tales of people saving money and paying others - people in organized crime - to smuggle them out.  It seems to me as if organized crime and their ability to operate across all borders is the great equalizer between states - looked at through this lens, no state is totally sovereign because no state can truly control 100% of the traffic on its borders - both of goods entering and goods leaving the country.

To me, the prevalence of organized crime brings into sharp focus the notion that money does indeed make the world go 'round.  Enough money can get you whatever you want if you have the right contacts... and even if you don't have the right contacts but you do have enough money and are fairly smart, you can buy your way into those contacts.  One thing that I continue to think about is that some organized criminal organizations began by selling their protection - that's how they used to run the unions in New York and Boston, that's how some Mexican organizations still operate by selling their protection to the corrupt politicians.  As in the Godfather, it's all about favors and money.  The more favors people owe you, the more power you have over them, the more money you have, the more power you can wield. 

Will states ever be able to get rid of organized crime?  Unlikely.  I know in class we often talk about the Federation from Star Trek, but I'm more of a Firefly kind of chick.  In that (sadly) short-lived show, there was the Alliance of the planets, but there was also plenty of smuggling and other organized criminal type activities.  Of course the big difference between those two universes... anyone... ideas... in Star Trek money was obsolete.  In Firefly money was still very much a thing.  As long as money and perceived power over others is around, we'll not be seeing a decrease in any organized crime - no matter how many gangsters or cartel members are captured.

PSCs and Sovereignty

One of the final questions that Prof. Jackson posed during the module was if there is such a thing as 'legitimate violence'. I think this question lays a great foundation for the discussion of PSCs and Organized Crime. This also serves to highlight that purely internal matters for a state have an impact on broader issues of sovereignty and legitimacy.

The simple answer to his question of legitimate violence is that it depends. In a liberal democracy, the government theoretically exercises power because it has the consent of the governed. Laws are enacted and enforced because the will of the majority is being expressed. Limits to that authority exist because of the respect for civil and human rights of all citizens. Or so theory states. In practice it's a much muddier picture.

However, there are many dictatorial regimes that do not even pretend to have limits to power. Where is the legitimacy of state security forces in that context? In such a situation, any PSC that derives authority from the state is lacking legitimacy by extension. In this frame, the PSC does not diminish the sovereignty of the state in any appreciable way because the state does not have legitimacy in the first place. The PSC is just another tool for government will.

This is in contrast to a situation where a PSC is able to gain enough control within a state so that it can change the rule of law to benefit the PSC. However, this is just as possible with any other corporate entity. The only difference is that a PSC's business is security, not just commodity extraction or manufacturing. So the threat to sovereignty comes from any corporation.

To Fundamentally Change or not to Fundamentally Change....What was the Question?

Interesting title I know however, this is how I feel when it comes to fundamentally change within the international realm. I feel most actors would like to change the system and create something grander than what has been created  but something deep down in me will always think that international actors(when push comes to shove) will emphatically revert back to a autonomous, anarchy, and sovereignty viewpoint becasue at the end of the day  countries will act upon the it's all about me, my self interest, and how I choose to protect and secure my country mentality. This type of thinking will make you put the Utopia yearning on the back burner and revert back to anarchy. This is what Waltz would call a natural state of anarchy. Like I mentioned in my argument, If you are looking through the eyes of Hobbs, an anarchic environment in the state of nature is described as a state of disorder and war of all against all. However, this description is not the case with many theorists including Waltz. According to Waltz, anarchic is described as “no sovereign body that governs the interactions between autonomous nation-states”. Waltz also points out that in an anarchic environment, war happens between states and is based on states wanting to survive (war exist when states struggle with the structure of the system). To me,the struggle will always exist.

Personal views on the debate and whether the international environment can be changed.

     Addressing the question of whether or not the international environment can be fundamentally changed is a bit more challenging then addressing a question about how it exists today. In asking questions about the current state of the international community, one only needs to consider whether a claim is valid or not; or whether or not we can reject the null hypothesis. When addressing questions of the future, we switch from asking “what is” to “what could be”. In asking the latter type of questions we find ourselves dealing with the probability of whether or not something will occur in the future. Any answer comes with a greater degree of uncertainty compared to questions about the world as it is. For either side to have a superior argument they must be able to prove that the change of the international environment is probable for the pro group or improbable for the con group.

                Both sides presented their arguments with a state focused approach and from the perspective that anarchy is the starting point of the environment. The con side focused more on Waltz while to pro side focused more on Wendt. Both sides were able to use these respective theories effectively in their arguments. However, the con side seemed to do a slightly better job of finding current events and specific examples to back the theories they chose to use. The pro side was able to call on more general examples illustrated by current conditions of the international environment. By this, I mean the existence of IO’s, alliances, and to some extent technology in the form of nuclear technology.

                Going forward, much of the debate seemed to become centered on the nature of IO’s as having agency or only being used by state actors. The con side also brought the question of human nature into question. The Pro side was not able to neglect the lack of agency within the international organizations but was able to emphasize that change is a slow process and the continued development and existence of these organizations seems to indicate that such a change occurring in the future is more probable. Regarding human nature, the con group brought up the Hobbian state of nature and the “predator theory” brought up in both Waltz and Wendt. Given the adaptive nature of humans and the degree to which human behavior and cognitions are based on their environment and culture I found the Hobbian argument to be a somewhat weak. Various social movements in the past have shown us that humans can change their perceptions about themselves and how they relate to others. Furthermore as institutions develop they often develop internal systems for dealing with corruption and other forms of selfish action. As for the predator theory, I find this to be a much stronger argument. However, they didn’t seem to properly address the role of emerging security communities interested in maintaining international security and the value of sovereignty.    

                Giving my own opinion I think that the con group didn’t quite prove that a future change in the international environment was improbable. The Pro group did a decent job of showing that it was a possibility but it wasn’t able to show that such a change was likely to occur soon enough for it to be relevant to today’s world. Proving that something not seen in history can occur in the future is a difficult task. However, proving that something conceivable can’t happen is also fairly challenging.

                 

Can the World be Remade?

This week's debate brought up many interesting arguments surrounding the question about if the international environment can be fundamentally remade. Although we expanded our scope towards the end, there is a topic that we didn't really delve into much, and that is the role of corporations.

Corporations have always had a role in the international environment, but people could argue that they are taking on a different role than they have in the past. Multi-national corporations extend beyond the borders of any individual state. Many take on the roles that states have traditionally held a monopoly on, such as espionage and security. Private security firms, such as the former Blackwater, possess military capabilities comparable to some states.

Combined with an ability to evade laws by setting up operations in a state with a more permissive legal environment there is the potential for changes to the international system. We have debated if states act out of interest or ideas, but I don't think this question applies to corporations writ large. A state must govern. A corporation does not have to.

However, these issues are not new. The Dutch East India Company had many of the hallmarks of a modern corporation. It also took on many of the powers usually reserved for states. It waged war, operated a legal system, and had a currency. The company began as a state-sanctioned monopoly. It did not operate as independently of the Dutch government as many modern corporations do.

In the foreseeable future corporations will not challenge the primacy of states in the international realm. They will, however, take on an increasingly important role on the international stage. The role they take will be determined by how willing governments will be to enforcing their laws and norms on corporations.

Results of the debate - I'm a cynical idealist

So the question is "Can the international environment be fundamentally remade?"  After the week of arguing for the pros and cons of this statement, I think the answer we've arrived at is a solid... maybe... depending on how one defines the "fundamentally remade" part.  

For me, I think that the answer is yes, the international environment can be fundamentally remade.  I think it will either be a gradual process as organizations like NATO and the UN and such barter for more power over the states who are members in the organizations, showing how it's beneficial to them to give up that power for greater security, more economic power, etc.  Or it'll happen in response to a cataclysmic event - being from Wyoming, my mind automatically goes to the super-volcano under Yellowstone blowing up and covering a good chunk of the world in ash, while plunging the rest of the world into an unnatural winter.  Based on how IO's began after world war 2 (in response to a cataclysmic event) I think that the chance of fundamental change happening in our life time is rather small - hence the cynicism.  In order to move toward the kind of governance that comes to mind (the Federation from Star Trek) I think that there would have to be a total shift in every country as to how they self-identify.  What I mean is, we could no longer say "I'm American" with the kind of emphasis we now do, it would have to shift to "I'm american."  We would have to see ourselves as citizens of the world first, Americans second.  This kind of shift is probably possible, but does require generations of people traveling the world, understanding world issues, electing leaders who truly have no intention of being the ones to push the nuclear button.  I'm writing this from an American standpoint, obviously, but I think it does cross other borders.  One of the most enlightening parts of travel is learning that people are people everywhere.  Disappointment in cancelled trains sounds the same in Budapest as it does in Paris or New York. 

Of course the image I have of an interconnected, understanding world is probably different from yours.  Hence the idealist in me.  Imagine a world with no war and no poverty.  I think we owe it to ourselves and to the future to even try to make that a reality.  Yes, there's plenty of other issues, but again, change takes time.  As for the issue of sovereignty... I think that every time we get scared or surprised, our reaction is to pull back, to assess the event, collect data, determine our reaction and then re-engage.  Every state at this point in time will pull back if they feel that their national identity is being threatened by international organizations or globalization.  That's why we tend to go back toward the billiard balls analogy.  The thing is, in our interconnected society, as technology reaches the furthest ends of the globe, I think that states will no longer be able to retreat back into an impermeable shell.  Like it or not, we're more connected than ever before and international states and organizations are trying to find their ways in a world where there is no precedent and it's scary and they're doing the best they can while making sure that their interests are served.  Basically I think that economics and technology will drive globalization and international cooperation more than any other factors.  We'll likely end up fighting radical groups within countries rather than countries themselves, which will make warfare totally different from any other point in history (as is happening now).  And eventually we will have to figure out if our national identity is more important than having a mutual place to live (good old planet Earth).

So perhaps I lean more toward cynical than idealist... I want good changes, I just have NO idea how they could come about... at least not right now... tune in next week.  :)

It's easy to get lost in the theory of these readings without seeing how they practically apply to current issues in international relations. However, Wendt's , “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," does exactly that. In looking to the future of relations between the post-communist Russia and the west, he says:

"Notwithstanding today's rhetoric about the end of the cold war, skeptics may still doubt whether Gorbachev (or some future leader) will succeed in building an intersubjective basis for a new Soviet (or Russian) role identity. There are important domestic, bureaucratic, and cognitive-ideological sources of resistance in both East and West to such a change, not the least of which is the shakiness of the democratic forces' domestic position. But if my argument about the role of intersubjective knowledge in creating competitive structures of identity and interest is right, then at least New Thinking shows a greater appreciation-conscious or not-for the deep structure of power politics than we are accustomed to in international relations practice." (Page 422[PDF 33])

It seems that the last few years have brought a return to some of the power politics between East and West. Russian rhetoric often talks about NATO as a threat to Russian national security. How is it that an organization which is defined as a mutual defense organization is viewed as an offensive threat to Russia? (NATO treaty text if you are interested. In short, Article 5 states an attack against one in Europe or North America is an attack against all.)

I think a good explanation lies in Wendt's article. He lays out an argument that, as I interpret it, suggests Russia has returned to its identity as enemy of the West. It seems that the 'important domestic, bureaucratic, and cognitive-ideological sources of resistance'  have won out, and that, for the time being, antagonistic relations between East and West will remain. Is it a coincidence that Putin is a former KGB officer?

There is much room for critical analysis of the West's actions since 1990. Particularly the interventions in the Balkans in 1995 and 1999 are often cited as evidence of Western aggression and reasons for Russia to be fearful. However, I believe that these actions are interpreted as aggressive towards Russia only if one believes that Russia and the West are antagonists already.

Wendt's Social Construction and Possibilities of Changing the International System

                Of the readings, Alexander Wendt’s article stood out in particular. The concepts of “intersubjective construction” and “identity formation” as being integral to the structure of the international system are without question significant ideas along with the concepts of neorealism and rationalism. Using these concepts, Wendt’s work seems to argue fairly effectively that the perception of state actors has been significant in forming the structures within the international system as it exists today.  It also suggested that these views held by state actors were possibly more malleable unlike some of the premises’ of the realist view point regarding human nature. This would bode well for the possibility of being able to change the international system as it suggests some features of the international community seen as structural are really left more to the agency of the state actors, even if the state actors are unaware of the degree to which they have agency. On the other hand, Wendt also suggests that some of these features are less malleable and more structural as a result of being institutionalized even though they were born of intersubjective construction.

                Focusing on states and the idea of sovereignty served Wentz well in his argument for those seeing states as still holding a majority of influence within the international arena. Assuming this is true, their predominant influence would suggest that states have the greatest potential to initiate and carry out change within the international system. Following this logic, it is conceivable that any form of a postmodernist world would have to be created by the actions of sovereign state actors. With that, an understanding of sovereign state actors would bring any analysis closer to answering the question of whether or not the international system can be changed.

                Furthermore, Wendt’s work in some ways tried to explain how the international system could come to be formed in a way that would seem to give credibility to the realist or Hobbian views of the world. In other words, Wendt explains how such an international system can develop irrelevant of the degree to which rationalists are accurate in describing human nature. The concept of the “predator state” brought up by Wendt did well to explain how a Hobbian world might develop even if the Hobbian view of human nature wasn’t true. This also complimented the concept of State actors focusing on their own security in their actions as opposed to their own desire for power; a concept brought up in the reading by Kenneth Waltz.

                It seems that there is certainly something to be said for the intersubjective construction of the international system by state actors based on their perception of both themselves and the other actors. However, it also seems that Wendt’s work fell somewhat short in not considering the degree to which real environmental factors might limit the agency of state actors. These potential factors include resource scarcity and other forms of physical adversity that may be faced by state actors. The need to resort to aggression may be born out of desperation as well as greed. It would also be important to consider in such an analysis that the development of various technologies and societies would limit these burdens on the state actors and give them more agency to form international systems out of intersubjective construction. This transition may also be facilitated by communication technology and many aspects of globalization which allow Wendt’s “Ego and Alter” to have a clearer understanding of the international community and reduce the chances of identities being constructed based on the false assumptions or understandings of other state actors. These issues are addressed in Wendt’s work but they seemed to be presented more as disclaimers. 

Can the International Environment Be Fundamentally Remade

If you go back through our history in international relations, you will see that we have come along way. Each actor and agency has had (in some way) some type of accountability or control of options that has changed the course of action or history of international relation. This is to include looking at the actors we had back in the 1940's who were Western and Asian male dominated,antiquated technology to the actors in the 21st century such as changes in technology,women taking on non- traditional roles,diversity dominated with many different countries and,changes in trade and the economy. Although we can see how the subject of international relations has drastically changed and remade from the 20th century to the 21st century,we know that change was implemented by the actions of certain actors who were involved.

With this said,  when it comes to change or remaking the international environment it seems to me that the  actors with high levels of agency  can and do have the capacity to change in contrast,actors with low levels of agency do not have the capacity to change. So we go back to the original question "can the international environment be fundamentally remade?". Well, I would imagine that it depends on the actions of the actors and agencies involved and whether or not they see a reason (within their social and cultural values, ideas and interest) to remake  or change the environment and if the change is for the greater good of the international society.

Changes

So can the international environment be remade?  If it were to be re-made, how might that happen.  Does complete globalization make sense?  Can states ever successfully integrate?  These are all great questions that are brought up for discussion this week.  Personally, I think that global cooperation is a good idea, but complete globalization does not seem to me to be plausible.  Some international organizations are able to function well within the parameters that they are defined, but if any international organization were to be totally effective, they would need to be able to use coercive force.  Or at least have some kind of coercion they could use in order to get states to do things when the states really don't want to do them.  The international stage is constantly changing as states gain and lose power, but a major restructuring of the international environment itself seems unlikely without some kind of outside catastrophe being the catalyst of such dramatic change. 

In thinking about international institutions, a part of the literature seems to sum them up perfectly.  In the Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal article, they state the presumption that states construct and shape institutions to advance their goal.  I think this presumption is correct because no state will willingly give an international institution more power than the state itself perceives that it wields.  And if the institution is perceived to be less beneficial to a state, they simply will not join it.  The incentives HAVE to outweigh the cost.  I think we see this not only in the international realm, but also in our personal lives.  I'm slowly coming around to the Hobbesian idea that the international stage is one of anarchy and each state trying to advance it's own interests (or at least the interests of those in power).  I still disagree with his view of the "natural" state of man, because I think it's very simplistic, but when taking his views and expanding them to countries, it makes sense.